The Supplier Who Wasn't: Rehearsing Your Invoice Fraud Response Before It Happens
The email that looks like a Tuesday
It arrives on a normal morning, from a supplier you have paid a dozen times. The wording is friendly but brisk. Their bank has changed, they say. Please update the sort code and account number before the next invoice. The logo is there. The email signature matches. Nobody would blame you for forwarding it to the person who runs the payment run and getting on with your day.
That is exactly the problem. Invoice redirection fraud does not need a clever hack. It needs a busy founder, a familiar name, and a payment that is already due. The money leaves by Faster Payments, lands in a stranger’s account, and is usually moved on before anyone notices the real supplier is still waiting to be paid.
At Enterprise Junction, we spend a lot of time at the junction where cash flow meets growth. This is one of those unglamorous checks that keeps a small firm upright. The good news is that it takes about five minutes to rehearse. The better news is that the rehearsal makes the real thing far less likely to work.
Why the scam keeps catching sensible people
Invoice fraud — sometimes called business email compromise or supplier impersonation — works because it borrows trust. The fraudster does not need to break into your bank. They need to break into a conversation. A hacked supplier inbox, a spoofed domain, a lookalike address with one letter changed: all of these can produce an email that reads like business as usual.
Small firms are especially exposed because the same person often approves the invoice, checks the bank details, and makes the payment. There is no separation of duties, no second pair of eyes, and no time to spare. The fraudster is betting on that.
There is also a timing trick. The request often lands just before a payment run, or on a Friday afternoon, or while the usual contact is on leave. Urgency is the tell — but only if you are looking for it.
The five-minute drill
This is not a policy document. It is a rehearsal. Run it once with whoever touches payments, then run it again when someone new joins.
1. Stop the reflex
The first rule is simple: a change of bank details is never actioned from the email alone. Not even if the email is from a supplier you have known for years. Not even if it says “urgent”. Not even if it is a reply to a thread you started.
2. Call back on a number you already hold
Use the phone number on the supplier’s website, your contract, or your accounting system — not the number in the email. Ask for the person who normally handles their accounts. Read back the new details and ask them to confirm. If they cannot confirm, do not pay.
This is called callback verification, and it is the single most effective control most small firms are not using consistently. It takes two minutes. It feels slightly awkward. It has stopped a lot of fraud.
3. Use dual authorisation — properly
Dual authorisation is not one person setting up the payment and another person clicking “approve” without looking. It is two people, two steps, and at least one out-of-band check. The person who sets up the new payee should not be the person who approves it. The approver should call the supplier using a known number. If your bank supports Confirmation of Payee, use it — but treat it as a smoke alarm, not a fire brigade. It checks the name against the account, and it does not know whether the supplier actually asked for the change.
4. Write the script down
Staff should not have to improvise when a supplier emails new bank details. Give them a short script:
“Thanks for your email. To protect both of us, we do not accept bank detail changes by email alone. I am going to call the number we hold on file to verify the change. We will not make the payment until that check is complete.”
That script does two things. It gives the person a polite way to slow things down, and it signals to a genuine supplier that you are careful. Most suppliers will respect it. A fraudster will often go quiet.
5. Log the attempt
If the email turns out to be fraudulent, do not just delete it. Save it, note the sender address, and tell your bank’s fraud team. Report it to Action Fraud and forward suspicious emails to the National Cyber Security Centre’s Suspicious Email Reporting Service. If the fraudster has been in a supplier’s inbox, that supplier needs to know too.
If the money has already gone
Speed matters. The first hour is the one that counts.
- Call your bank’s fraud line immediately. Use the number on your bank’s website or the back of your card, not a number in an email. Ask them to recall the payment and freeze the payee.
- Report it to Action Fraud and keep the reference.
- Tell your supplier — by phone, on a known number — that their name has been used. They may be dealing with a wider breach.
- Check your other pending payments. If one invoice has been redirected, others may be targeted too.
- Review how the email got through. Was it a spoofed domain, a hacked inbox, or a lookalike address? Update your email filters and tell your team what to look for.
Make it boring, make it habit
Fraud prevention works best when it is dull. A five-minute drill before the next payment run is worth more than a 20-page policy nobody reads. Put the callback rule in your finance manual. Add a “new payee” check to your bank’s approval workflow. Mention it in your next team meeting. Then do it again in three months, because new starters forget and old habits creep back.
The founders who come through Enterprise Junction are usually trying to grow something real. Growth means more suppliers, more invoices, and more payment runs. That is also more surface area for a fraudster. A short rehearsal now is a small price for keeping the cash — and the supplier relationship — where they belong.